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NOTE 
CASSISTA v. COMMUNITY FOODS, INC.: 
DRAWING THE LINE AT OBESITY? 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Cassista v. Community Foods, Inc.,t the California Su-
preme Court held that the state Fair Employment and Housing 
Act (FEHA)2 does not protect overweight people from employ-
ment discrimination on the basis of weight unless they can prove 
that they are "physically disabled" within the meaning of the 
FEHA.3 The court reasoned that, while the statute proscribes 
employers from discriminating against people whom they per-
ceive to have a disability,· if that perceived disability does not 
fit into one of the statute's specifically enumerated disorders, 
then the statute does not proscribe that discrimination. I! The 
court then concluded that obesity alone does not fall into one of 
the enumerated types of disorder,6 and thus the FEHA did not 
protect Cassista from discrimination on that basis.7 
This Note will discuss the background of the FEHA, and 
give a brief overview of the federal statutes upon which the 
FEHA is modeled, the policy of the FEHA, and obesity discrimi-
nation. The overview will be followed by an analysis of the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court's application of the law to the facts III 
Cassista, and a critique of the court's reasoning. 
1. 856 P.2d 1143 (Cal. 1993). 
2. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 12,900-12,996 (West 1980 & Supp. 1993). 
3. See Cassista, 856 P.2d at 1144. 
4. See CAL. GOv'T CODE § 12,926(k). 
5. Cassista, 856 P.2d at 1153. 
6. Id. at 1152-53. 
7. Id. at 1154. 
523 
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II. FACTS 
Toni Linda Cassista (plaintiff/appellant) stands five foot 
four inches tall, and when she applied for a job at Community 
Foods, a co-operative health food store in Santa Cruz, Califor-
nia, she weighed three hundred and five pounds.s After an initial 
interview, she was asked to return for a second, more in-depth, 
interview.9 Cassista was neither hired for any of the job vacan-
cies at the store, nor for any of the subsequent openings for 
which she resubmitted her application.10 She called defendant/ 
respondent Will Hildeburn, Community Foods' personnel coor-
dinator, to ask what she might do to improve her chances to be 
hired for a future position.l1 Cassista testified that Hildeburn 
told her the members of the hiring committee were concerned 
that she could not physically do the work because of her 
weight. 12 Hildeburn testified he told Cassista they had hired 
people with more experience; however, he also admitted telling 
her "there was some concern about your weight. "13 
Cassista filed a complaint with the Department of Fair Em-
ployment and Housing (DFEH) alleging that Community Foods 
discriminated against her on the basis of her weight. 14 After the 
DFEH decided not to file a complaint, Cassista filed suit against 
Community Foods under the FEHA, alleging that the store de-
nied her employment in violation of the Act's proscription 
against discrimination based on physical handicap. II! 
8. [d. at 1144. 




13. [d. The facts are disputed by the parties. Hildeburn and the hiring committee 
met with Cassista to discuss with her the reasons she was not hired. At this meeting, 
members of the committee gave their views of weight and its effects on job performance. 
At trial, Community Foods presented an expert witness who testified that the narrow 
aisles and ladders in the store would constitute a hazardous workplace for an individual 
of Cassista's weight. Nonetheless, all the members of the hiring committee testified that 
Cassista's weight played no part in their hiring decision. [d. at 1145-46. 
14. [d. at 1145. 
15. [d. After she filed her complaint, Community Foods offered her a job, which she 
declined. Cassista refused the offer in part because she believed it came only because she 
complained to the DFEH. Cassista v. Community Foods, Inc., 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 98, 102 
(Ct. App. 1992), rev'd, 856 P.2d 1143 (Cal. 1993). 
2
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Cassista lost in the trial court,16 but the 'verdict was over-
turned on appealY The Court of Appeal held that the trial 
court judge issued a prejudicially erroneous jury instruction,18 
and that the evidence showed that the hiring committee at Com-
munity Foods viewed Cassista as having a physical disability 
within the meaning of that term under the FEHA.19 The su-
preme court granted review to determine whether Cassista had 
established disability discrimination under the FEHA.20 
III. BACKGROUND OF THE FAIR EMPLOYMENT AND 
HOUSING ACT21 
The evolution of the FEHA manifests its reliance upon the 
Federal Rehabilitation Act and the Federal Americans with Dis-
abilities Act for its major provisions. These federal laws are rele-
vant to an examination of the FEHA because the FEHA and its 
regulations are modeled on the Rehabilitation Act and the 
Americans With Disabilities Act.22 Further, the California Su-
preme Court noted that "interpretations of federal law may be 
particularly useful 'to guide the construction' of this [the physi-
cal disability] provision of California's antidiscrimination act."23 
Finally, the California Legislature declared that the Americans 
with Disabilities Act's protections, where broader than those of 
the FEHA, shall prevail. 24 
16. Cassista v. Community Foods, Inc., 856 P.2d at 1146. 
17. Id. 
18. Id. The trial judge told the jury that Cassista had to prove that but for her 
weight, the hiring committee would have hired her. The California Supreme Court's 
opinion addressed only the issue of whether obesity fit into one of the enumerated cate· 
gories of physical disability. However, examination of the briefs filed by the parties and 
several amici curiae reveals that all of these briefs viewed that issue as tangential, deal· 
ing with it in a cursory manner at the end of their briefs. The issues briefed in depth 
were those involving standards of proof, burdens of proof, and specific lines of analysis 
developed in previous cases to examine employers' motives when inquiring about an em· 
ployee's disability. None of these issues were mentioned in the final opinion. See, e.g., 
Brief of Amicus Curiae Employment Law Ctr., Cassista v. Community Foods, Inc., 856 
P.2d 1143 (1993) (No. S028230). 
19. Cassista, 856 P.2d at 1146. 
20.Id. 
21. The FEHA is codified at CAL. GOv'T CODE §§ 12,900·12,996 (West 1980 & Supp. 
1993). 
22. Cassista, 856 P.2d at 1152. 
23.Id. 
24. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12,926(p): 
Notwithstanding subdivisions (i) and (k), if the definition of 
3
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A. HISTORY OF THE STATUTE AND AMENDMENTS 
California's statutory proscription against employment dis-
crimination was first enacted in 1959 as the Fair Employment 
Practices Act. 211 The Act proscribed employment discrimination 
on the bases of race, creed, color, national origin, and ancestry.26 
In 1973, the Legislature amended the Act to include physical 
handicap as a prohibited ground of employment discrimina-
tion. 27 Later amendments combined the Fair Employment Prac-
tices Act with the Fair Housing Act into the current Fair Em-
ployment and Housing Act.28 
In 1980, the Fair Employment and Housing Commission 
(FEHC), the administrative agency charged with the rulemaking 
and quasi-judicial functions involved in enforcing the FEHA,29 
promulgated a regulation defining "handicapped individual." 
That regulation tracks the federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973,30 
which proscribes discrimination on the basis of physical handi-
cap by federal contractors and recipients of federal funds. 31 
In 1990, the federal government enacted the Americans with 
Disabilities Act (ADA),32 which adopted the Rehabilitation Act's 
definition of "physical handicap."33 In 1992, the California Leg-
islature amended the FEHA, changing the term "handicap" to 
"disability" used in the Americans With Disabilities Act of 
1990 (Public Law 101-336) would result in broader protection 
of the civil rights of individuals with a mental disability or 
physical disability. . . then that broader protection or cover-
age shall be deemed incorporated by reference into, and shall 
prevail over conflicting provisions of, the definitions in subdi-
visions (i) and (k). 
25. See Marjorie Gelb & JoAnne Frankfurt, California's Fair Employment and 
Housing Act: A Viable State Remedy for Employment Discrimination, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 
1055, 1057-58 (1983). 
26. Id. at 1058. 
27. Id. at 1059. 
28. Id. at 1061. 
29. Id. at 1060-61. 
30. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-794 (1993). 
31. Cassista, 856 P.2d at 1149-50. 
32. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12,101-213 (West Supp. 1991) & 47 U.S.C. §§ 225,611 (1991»; 
see infra notes 46-56 and accompanying text. 
33. Cassista, 856 P.2d at 1150. 
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"disability" and modeling its definition of "physical disability"34 
on that of the Americans with Disabilities Act.35 The result is 
that the FEHA and its regulations are in harmony, tracking the 
Americans with Disabilities Act, which in turn tracks the Reha-
bilitation Act's definition of "physical disability."36 
Although Cassista arose prior to the 1992 amendment, the 
court analyzed it under the amended law. The Legislature man-
dated that the definition of "physical disability" remain the 
same as previously defined, to maintain continuity in the law,37 
so the analysis would be the same under either version of the 
statute. 
The present FEHA proscribes discrimination in employ-
ment and housing on the basis of race, religious creed, color, na-
tional origin, ancestry, physical disability, mental disability, 
medical condition, marital status, sex, or age.38 The prohibition 
against discrimination based on physical disability is subject to 
two exceptions: where the disability prevents the employee from 
performing the required duties,39 and where the disability pre-
vents the employee from performing his or her duties safely.40 
The California Legislature declared that the FEHA was en-
acted because: 
It is recognized that the practice of denying em-
ployment opportunity and discriminating in the 
34. See infra part V. for a discussion of the definition of "physical disability." 
35. Cassista, 856 P.2d at 1149-50. 
36. [d. 
37. [d. at 1149. 
38. CAL. GOv'T CODE § 12,920. The FEHA applies to all employers who regularly 
employ five or more people. The scope of the federal statute on which the FEHA is 
modeled, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, applies only to federal contractors and employ-
ers who receive federal assistance. Cassista, 856 P.2d at 1149. 
39. Some courts call this exception the "business necessity" exception. See, e.g., 
Greene v. Union Pacific R.R., 548 F. Supp. 3 (W.D. Wash. 1981). 
40. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 12,940(a)(1): 
Nothing in this part shall prohibit an employer from refusing 
to hire or discharging an employee with a physical or mental 
disability. . . where the employee, because of his or her phys-
ical or mental disability, is unable to perform his or her essen-
tial duties even with reasonable accommodations, or cannot 
perform those duties in a manner that would not endanger his 
or her health or safety or the health and safety of others even 
with reasonable accommodations. 
5
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terms of employment for such reasons foments 
domestic strife and unrest, deprives the state of 
the fullest utilization of its capacities for develop-
ment and advance, and substantially and ad-
versely affects the interest of employees, employ-
ers, and the public in general.41 
Further, the Legislature has mandated that the FEHA be "con-
strued liberally for the accomplishment of the purposes 
thereof. "42 
California Government Code section 12,926 controls the is-
sue of whether obesity is a physical disability. The California 
Supreme Court's opinion in Cassista is devoted in large part to 
the analysis of this section, which reads: 
(k) "physical disability" includes, but is not lim-
ited to, all of the following: 
(1) Having any physiological disease, disorder, 
condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical 
loss that does both of the following: 
(A) Affects one or more of the following body sys-
tems: neurological; immunological; musculoskele-
tal; special sense organs, respiratory, including 
speech organs, cardiovascular, reproductive, di-
gestive, genitourinary, hemic and lymphatic, skin, 
and endocrine. 
(B) Limits an individual's ability to participate in 
major life activities. 
(2) Any other health impairment not described in 
paragraph (1) that requires special education or. 
related services. 
(3) Being regarded as having or having had a dis-
ease, disorder, condition, cosmetic disfigurement, 
anatomical loss, or health impairment described 
in paragraph (1) or (2). 
(4) Being regarded as having, or having had, a 
disease [sic] disorder, condition, cosmetic disfig-
urement, anatomical loss, or health impairment 
that has no present disabling effect but may be-
come a physical disability as described in para-
graph (1) or (2).43 
41. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 12,920. 
42. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 12,993. 
43. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12,926. 
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Cassista brought her suit under the "being regarded as having" 
subsection (3).44 
B. THE RELATED FEDERAL STATUTES 
1. The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 
Congress enacted the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 to equalize 
the employment opportunities of the disabled. 411 Section 504 of 
the Act mandates that "no otherwise qualified handicapped in-
dividual shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded 
from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected 
to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Fed-
eral financial assistance .... "46 
Amendments enacted in 197447 defined "handicapped indi-
vidual" as someone who "(i) has a physical or mental impair-
ment which substantially limits one or more of such person's 
major life activities, (ii) has a record of such an impairment, or 
(iii) is regarded as having such an impairment."48 A major life 
activity is one such as "caring for one's self, performing manual 
tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, 
and working."49 
Congress added the phrase "is regarded as having such an 
44. Cassista, 856 P.2d at 1153 (citing CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12,926(k)(3». 
45. 29 U.S.C. § 701 (1993). See also Paula B. Stolker, Weigh My Job Performance, 
Not My Body: Extending Title VII to Weight-Based Discrimination, 10 N.Y.L. SCH. J. 
HUM. RTS. 223 (1992) (discussing weight- and appearance-based discrimination, primarily 
by airlines against flight attendants). 
46. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1993). 
47. See, e.g., Thomas Edward Seguine, What's A Handicap Anyway? Analyzing 
Handicap Claims Under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and Analogous State Statutes, 
22 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 529, 531 (1986) (discussing the history of the Rehabilitation Act 
and giving an in-depth analysis of the statute, and several case studies involving analo-
gous state statutes). 
48. 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(B) (1993). 
49. 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(ii) (1993). The regulations promulgated under the statute 
by the Department of Health and Human Services provide in part: 
(iv) "Is regarded as having an impairment" means (A) has a 
physical or mental impairment that does not substantially 
limit major life activities but that is treated by a recipient as 
constituting such a limitation; (B) has a physical or mental 
impairment that substantially limits major life activities only 
as a result of the attitudes of others toward such impairment 
7
Dunworth: Cassista v. Community Foods
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1994
530 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 24:523 
impairment" "to protect people who are denied employment be-
cause of an employer's perceptions, whether or not those percep-
tions are accurate. It is of little solace to a person denied em-
ployment to know that the employer's view of his or her 
condition is erroneous."110 
2. The Americans with Disabilities Act 
The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990111 extended the 
protections of the Rehabilitation Act to the private sector.1I2 Un-
til July 25, 1994, the ADA's proscriptions against disability dis-
crimination apply to all private employers with twenty-five or 
more employees. liS After that date, the ADA extends to private 
employers with fifteen or more employees. The ADA applies im-
mediately to all governmental and public entities.1I4 
Congress enacted the ADA upon finding that some 
43,000,000 Americans have some form of physical or mental dis-
ability,1I11 are continually subjected to discrimination in a variety 
of contexts including employment,1I8 and are severely disadvan-
taged socially, vocationally, economically, and educationally.067 
Further, people with disabilities are: 
[A] discrete and insular minority who have been 
faced with restrictions and limitations, subjected 
to a history of purposeful unequal treatment, and 
relegated to a position of political powerlessness 
in our society, based on characteristics that are 
beyond the control of such individuals and result-
ing from stereotypic assumptions not truly indica-
tive of the individual ability of such individuals to 
participate in, and contribute to, society . . . :i8 
"Qualified individuals with disabilities" are protected by Ti-
50. E. E. Black, Ltd. v. Marshall, 497 F. Supp. 1088, 1097 (D. Haw. 1980). 
51. See supra note 32. 
52. See Nancy Lee Jones, Overview and Essential Requirements of the Americans 
with Disabilities Act, 64 TEMP. L. REV. 471, 475 (1991). 
53. 42 U.S.C. § 12,111(5)(A) (1991). 
54. 28 C.F.R. § 35.140 app. A (1992). 
55. 42 U.S.C. § 12,l01(a)(1). 
56. [d. § 12,101(a)(5). 
57. [d. § 12,101(a)(6). 
58. [d. § 12,101(a)(7). 
8
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tle I of the ADA,1I9 which defines "physical disability" by the 
same definition as that of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.60 Em-
ployers may raise the same two defenses to a charge of discrimi-
nation under the ADA as under the Rehabilitation Act: business 
necessity and safety concerns.61 
IV. OBESITY DISCRIMINATION DECISIONS IN THE 
UNITED STATES 
Case law in the area of obesity discrimination in the state 
and federal courts reveals that the courts are split among three 
predominant holdings: Obesity is not a disability; weight stan-
dards are related to safety concerns and thus are legal; or obes-
ity is a disability. 
A. OBESITY IS NOT A DISABILITY 
Most courts considering the issue of obesity discrimination 
have held that obesity, without more, is not a physical disabil-
ity.62 For example, in Krein v. Marian Manor Nursing Home,63 
a nurse's aide brought suit alleging in part that she was dis-
charged because of her obesity in violation of state law prohibit-
ing discrimination on the basis of physical disability. The em-
ployee testified that she suffered from no medical condition in 
connection with her obesity, and that her weight did not impair 
her abilities.64 The court stated without analysis that obesity 
alone does not constitute a physical disability.611 
In Tudyman v. United Airlines,66 a male bodybuilder 
59. Id. § 12,112(a). 
60. See supra notes 47-50 and accompanying text. 
61. Jones, supra note 52, at 482 (analyzing in depth the provisions of the ADA). In 
addition, a third defense under the ADA allows religious entities to give hiring prefer-
ence to people of a certain religion. Id. 
62. See, e.g., Donald L. Bierman, Jr., Employment Discrimination Against Over-
weight Individuals: Should Obesity Be A Protected Classification?, 30 SANTA CLARA L. 
REV. 951, 961 (1990) (discussing what obesity means, what constitutes a handicap, and 
obesity discrimination case law). 
63. 415 N.W.2d 793 (N.D. 1987). 
64. Krein, 415 N.W.2d at 796. Krein testified that her weight aggravated her asthma 
and made her more susceptible to colds and flu. The court stated that these common 
ailments did not constitute a disability. Id. 
65. See id. 
66. 608 F. Supp. 739 (D. Cal. 1984). 
9
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brought suit under the Rehabilitation Act alleging discrimina-
tion on the basis of physical handicap. He was terminated and 
. his subsequent petition for reinstatement was denied because 
his weight exceeded the airline's height-weight guidelines.67 The 
court held the "inability to obtain a single job does not render 
one 'handicapped'."88 The court observed that the plaintiff's 
weight was "self-imposed and voluntary," a fact the court con-
sidered important.69 
In a holding substantially identical to that of Cassista, and 
resulting from a similar analysis, the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court held that in order for obesity to constitute a physical disa-
bility, a claimant must show that his or her obesity was caused 
by, or caused, a type of disorder within the meaning of Pennsyl-
vania's statute.70 In that case, a city laborer failed to lose enough 
weight to meet height-weight standards promulgated for city la-
borers, and the city suspended him without pay.71 
Courts have thus used either dissimilar analyses, or asser-
tion unaccompanied by analysis, to reach the holding that obes-
ity is not a protected disability. 
67. Tudyman, 608 F. Supp. at 741. The opinion noted that the bodybuilder was not 
overweight or in poor shape; in fact, his low percentage of fat and high percentage of 
muscle resulted in his weight exceeding the airline's standards. 
68. Id. at 745; see supra note 49 and accompanying text. 
69. Id. at 746. The court analogized the bodybuilder's weight to the "voluntary" 
conditions of drug addiction and alcoholism, and noted that amendments to the Rehabil-
itation Act in 1978 specifically excepted some present addicts and alcoholics from inclu-
sion as protected handicapped individuals under the Act. Id. 
70. Civil Servo Comm'n v. Pennsylvania Human Relations Comm'n, 591 A.2d 281 
(Pa. 1991) (holding that an employee's requested job transfer to a park laborer position 
could be predicated on his losing weight, since obesity was not a protected handicap). 
The pertinent Pennsylvania statute tracks the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. See id. at 282-
83. See also Robin Chodak, Civil Rights-Handicap Discrimination Law-Pennsylvania 
Excludes Obesity From Protection Under the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, 65 
TEMP. L. REV. 623 (1992) (analyzing this decision in detail and discussing handicap dis-
crimination in genera!); Greene v. Union Pac. R.R., 548 F. Supp. 3, 5 (W.D. Wa. 1981) 
(holding that obesity is not a physical handicap within the contemplation of Washington 
law because it is "not an immutable condition such as blindness or lameness"); Missouri 
Comm'n on Human Rights V. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 699 S.W.2d 75 (Mo. Ct. App. 
1985) (noting in dicta that obesity, without more, was probably not a handicap). 
71. Civil Servo Comm'n V. Pennsylvania Human Relations Comm'n, 591 A.2d 281, 
281-82 (Pa. 1991). 
10
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B. WEIGHT STANDARDS ARE RELATED TO SAFETY CONCERNS 
In some cases courts have held that weight standards are 
legal if they constitute a "bona fide occupational qualification" 
(BFOQ).72 For example, in Lipton v. New York State Human 
Rights Appeal Board,73 the court held without analysis that the 
complainant's obesity and high blood pressure diminished her 
ability to perform her job. The court added that the Appeal 
Board should "restrict its intervention to cases in which the al-
leged discrimination is unrelated to the nature of the 
employment. "74 
In Velger v. Williams,7Il an obese man was discharged from 
his probationary position as a hazardous waste investigator. He 
alleged that he was dismissed in part because of his weight.76 
The court held that "an employer is not guilty of unlawful dis-
.crimination against a person with a physical impairment if that 
person's condition is 'in any way related to the duties the person 
was required to perform in connection with [his] position'."77 
Another case that involved weight and the ability to ade-
quately perform job duties is McMillen v. Civil Service Commis-
sion.7s A fire department ambulance driver charged the Los An-
geles City Fire Department with discriminating against him on 
the basis of physical disability when the Department disciplined 
him for failing to meet body weight standards.79 The court rea-
soned that because ambulance drivers are required to possess 
strength, agility, and the ability to lift and climb,so the depart-
72. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12,940; Sterling Transit Co. v. Fair Employment Practice 
Comm'n, 175 Cal. Rptr. 548 (Ct. App. 1981) (holding a trucking company's blanket pol-
icy of excluding all persons with back anomalies from employment violated the Fair Em-
ployment Practice Act (now the FEHA)). In a discussion of the BFOQ defense raised by 
the tmcking company, the court noted that the defense "relates to whether handicapped 
persons are unable to presently safely and efficiently perform the job duties." [d. at 550. 
73. 413 N.Y.S.2d 233 (1979). 
74. Lipton, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 234. 
75. 500 N.Y.S.2d 411, 412 (App. Div. 1986). 
76. [d. Petitioner was also Jewish, and alleged that his religion provided another 
basis for his dismissal. The court noted that among the reasons for the petitioner's dis-
missal were "his weight, his poor personal hygiene and his bad attitude." 
77. [d. at 412 (citing Miller v. Ravitch, 60 N.Y.2d 527 (1983)) (emphasis added). 
78. 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d 548 (Ct. App. 1992). 
79. [d. at 550. 
80. [d. at 551. 
11
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ment's weight standards were reasonable "as a means of ensur-
. ing the safety of its employees and members of the public."81 
The court held, "[e]mployee height and weight limitations may 
be prescribed by an employer where there is a rational basis for 
such limitations, as shown by supportive analytical factual data 
rather than stereotypical generalizations. "82 
C. OBESITY IS A DISABILITY 
Few cases dealing with obesity discrimination have held 
that obesity without more constitutes a physical disability.8s In 
State Division of Human Rights v. Xerox Corp.,8' Xerox Corpo-
ration refused to hire Catherine McDermott because she was 
obese. She failed the preemployment medical examination solely 
because of her obesity, and the examining physician concluded 
that she was "not medically acceptable" for employment.811 The 
State Division of Human Rights filed a complaint against Xerox 
on McDermott's behalf, alleging that she was discriminated 
against on the basis of a disability in violation of New York's 
Human Rights Law.88 That statute defines "disability" more 
broadly than statutes which track the Rehabilitation Act.87 
Under the Human Rights Law, disabilities "are not limited to 
physical or mental impairments, but may also include 'medical' 
impairments .... [T]o qualify as a disability, the condition may 
manifest itself . . . by being 'demonstrable by medically ac-
cepted clinical or laboratory diagnostic techniques'."88 The court 
held that McDermott's obesity fell into that definition of disa-
bility because it was clinically diagnosed, and rejected the argu-
ment that the statute should apply only to immutable disabili-
81. Id. McMillen (the ambulance driver) did not feel his weight compromised his 
ability to perform his duties. Id. at 550. 
82. Id; see also Hegwer v. Board of Civil Servo Comm'rs, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 389 (Ct. 
App. 1992) (upholding the suspension of an obese paramedic who suffered from a thyroid 
condition in part because the Department's weight standards were based upon a bona 
fide occupational qualification). 
83. Michigan is the only state that explicitly includes weight as a protected classifi-
cation. See, e.g., Karol V. Mason, Employment Discrimination Against the Overweight, 
15 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 337, 354 (1982). 
84. 480 N.E.2d 695 (N.Y. 1985). 
85. Xerox, 480 N.E.2d at 696. The medical examination revealed no other condi-
tions except obesity. 
86.Id. 
87. Id. at 698. 
88.Id. 
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ties: "[T]he statute protects all persons with disabilities and not 
just those with hopeless conditions."89 
New Jersey's statutory prohibition against discrimination 
against disabled people is substantially similar to the New York 
statute.90 In Gimello u. Agency Rent-A-Car Systems,9} an office 
manager for a car rental company claimed he was fired because 
he was obese.92 The court affirmed the conclusion of the admin-
istrative law judge that Gimello, in part because he had sought 
medical treatment for his obesity, had shown that his obesity 
constituted a physical "handicap" within the meaning of the 
statute.93 The court limited its holding to the facts, noting that 
the lower court did not address the issue of whether obesity was 
a disability in every case.94 
In a recent decision, the First Circuit Court of Appeals af-
firmed a lower court's ruling granting damages and equitable re-
lief to a woman denied reemployment because of her obesity.91i 
Bonnie Cook had two separate periods of employment as an in-
stitutional attendant for the mentally retarded at the Depart-
ment of Mental Health, Retardation, and Hospitals (MHRH); 
both times she maintained a spotless performance record.96 
When she sought reemployment, MHRH refused to rehire her in 
part because it claimed her obesity impaired her ability to evac-
uate patients in an emergency.97 Cook brought suit against 
MHRH under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.98 The jury 
returned a verdict for Cook, which the First Circuit affirmed on 
89. [d. 
90. See Gimello v. Agency Rent-A-Car Sys., 594 A.2d 264, 276 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 
Div. 1991). 
91. 594 A.2d 264 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991). 
92. [d. at 265. The court's detailed summary of the facts showed that during his 
five-year employment with the car rental company, Gimello received many commenda-
tions for his superior performance. Two upper-level officers of the company objected to 
Gimello because of his obesity, and were the source of the discriminatory treatment of 
Gimello. [d. at 266-72. 
93. [d. at 273. 
94. [d. 
95. Cook v. Rhode Island, 10 F.3d 17, 20-21 (1st Cir. 1993). 
96. [d. at 20. 
97. [d. at 21. MHRH also claimed that Cook's obesity put her at risk of contracting 
more serious ailments, which would result in absenteeism and workers' compensation 
claims. [d. 
98. Cook, 10 F.3d at 21. 
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appea1.99 
Cassista was decided while Cook was on appeapoo The Cali-
fornia Supreme Court discussed with approval the portion of the 
lower court opinion in Cook that stated, "to the extent that 
obesity is a transitory or self-imposed condition resulting from 
an individual's voluntary action or inaction, it would be neither 
a physiological disorder nor a handicap."lol The First Circuit 
Court of Appeals rejected the lower court's ruling on this point, 
noting the Rehabilitation Act: 
contains no language suggesting that its protec-
tion is linked to . . . whether an individual con-
tributed to his or her impairment. On the con-
trary, the Act indisputably applies to numerous 
conditions that may be caused or exacerbated by 
voluntary conduct, such as alcoholism, AIDS, dia-
betes, [and] cancer resulting from cigarette 
smoking. . . .102 
Bonnie Cook claimed that MHRH discriminated against her 
because it perceived her obesity to be a disability.l03 The First 
Circuit analyzed the interpretive regulations of the Rehabilita-
tion Act,104 and noted that the enumerated disorders in the reg-
ulations "are open-ended; they do not purport to set forth [an 
exclusive] list of specific diseases and conditions ... because of 
the difficulty of .ensuring the comprehensiveness of any such 
list. "105 MHRH's own expert physician gave his opinion that 
"obesity affects 'virtually every [body] system,' including the 
cardiovascular, immune, musculoskeletal, and sensory 
99.Id. 
100. See Plaintiff-Appellant's Petition for Rehearing at 5, Cassista v. Community 
Foods, Inc., 856 P.2d 1143 (Cal. 1993) (No. S028230) (arguing that the California Su-
preme Court's favorable discussion of the reasoning of Cook was a violation of the Cali-
fornia Rules of Court, which disallow citation of the lower court opinion where the case 
is on appeal). 
101. See Cassista, 856 P.2d at 1152 (citing Cook v. Rhode Island, 783 F. Supp. 1569, 
1573 (D. R.I. 1992), aft'd, 10 F.3d 17 (1st Cir. 1993). 
102. Cook, 10 F.3d at 24. 
103. Cook, 10 F.3d at 22. 
104. These regulations and the FEHA are substantially identical. See supra note 43 
and accompanying text. 
105. Cook, 10 F.3d at 22-23 (citing 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(i)(A) (1992»; see also CAL. 
GOV'T CODE § 12,926(k)(1)(B). 
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systems. "106 
The court proceeded to analyze whether Cook's obesity lim-
ited one or more of her major life activities. 107 MHRH's physi-
cian refused to hire Cook because he believed that her obesity 
hampered her ability to walk, lift, bend, stoop, kneel, and thus 
work; the court held that MHRH perceived Cook as being una-
ble to function in major life activities on this basis. lOS Noting 
that "in a society that all too often confuses 'slim' with 'beauti-
ful' or 'good' . . . obesity can present formidable barriers to em-
ployment," the court held that the record presented ample evi-
dence for the jury to conclude MHRH discriminated against 
Cook because it perceived her to be disabled. 109 
Like the cases rejecting obesity as a disability, the cases 
which include obesity within statutory protections of the dis-
abled do not present a common pattern of reasoning. The Rhode 
Island court analyzed the same statute as did California and 
Pennsylvania,l1O and reached the opposite conclusion. The other 
cases discussed in this section involved antidiscrimination stat-
utes that differ from the Rehabilitation Act and those state stat-
utes which track it. 111 Obesity discrimination remains a fluctuat-
ing and non-cohesive area of law. 
V. THE CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT'S ANALYSIS 
The California Supreme Court began its analysis by under-
taking to determine the parameters of the phrase "physical disa-
bility," beginning with an examination of the statutory language 
of the FEHA. The court next discussed the standard of "physi-
cal disability" formulated in American National Insurance Co. 
v. Fair Employment & Housing Commission,l12 because the 
Legislature expressly included that standard in the statutory 
definition.ll3 After a brief survey of case law involving obesity 
106. Cook, 10 F.3d at 23 n.6. 
107. See id. at 25 (applying 45 C.F.R. § 84.3U)(2)(ii). 
108. Id. 
109. Id. at 28. 
110. See supra note 70 and accompanying text. 
111. See supra notes 84-94 and accompanying text. 
112. 651 P.2d 1151 (Cal. 1982). 
113. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12,926(k) (West Supp. 1993). 
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discrimination, the court concluded that Cassista failed to pre-
sent a prima facie case of physical disability discrimination: 
[I]t is not enough to show that an employer's de-
cision is based on the perception that an appli-
cant is disqualified by his or her weight. The ap-
plicant must be "regarded as having or having 
had" a condition "described in paragraph (1) or 
(2)," to wit, a physiological disease or disorder af-
fecting one or more of the bodily systems.114 
A. DEFINING "PHYSICAL DISABILITY" 
1. The Statutory Definition 
The court stated at the outset of the opinion that its task on 
review was a narrow one: to determine whether Cassista's weight 
fit into the definition of "physical handicap" in the statute. ll5 
The court stressed that it would not itself define "physical hand-
icap," but only determine the parameters of the term as deduced 
from the language and legislative history of section 12,926 of the 
FEHA.1l6 
After providing a brief history of section 12,926, the court 
discussed in great detail the disorders enumerated in the stat-
ute, i.e., explicating the phrases "impairment of sight, hearing 
[sic] or speech", "amputation", and "loss of coordination."1l7 
The court then addressed the holding in American National In-
surance Co. v. Fair Employment & Housing Commission. 1l8 
2. The Definition of "Physical Disability" in American 
National 
The statutory standard for "physical disability" includes 
the court's previous construction of the term "physical 
114. Cassista, 856 P.2d at 1153. 
115. Id. at 1146-47. 
116. Id. This suit arose under the pre-1992 version of the statute, but the court 
analyzed it under the amended language, pursuant to the Legislature's declared inten-
tion that the standard of "physical disability" remain the same. Id. at 1149. 
117. Cassista, 856 P.2d at 1147. 
118. 651 P.2d 1151 (Cal. 1982). 
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handicap"ll9 in American National Insurance Co. v. Fair Em-
ployment & Housing Commission. 120 In that case, the court ex-
amined whether high blood pressure, in the circumstances of 
that case, fit into the category of physical handicap for purposes 
of Labor Code section 1420,121 the predecessor statute to the 
FEHA.122 The defendant insurance company,. as a matter of pol-
icy, did not hire people with high blood pressure for jobs as sales 
and debit agents, because it regarded that position as a stressful 
one.123 It terminated Dale Rivard from his position as a sales 
and debit agent because he had high blood pressure, and Rivard 
filed a complaint against the company, alleging that it discrimi-
nated against him on the basis of physical handicap.124 
The court examined section 12,926(h),l2I! which provided a 
definition of "physical handicap" that "includes [impairment of 
sight, hearing, etc.]." The court analyzed the statute's use of the 
word "includes" and determined that the word was not intended 
by the legislature to endorse a restrictive definition, because a 
specifically restrictive term, such as "means," could have been 
chosen.126 Noting the legislative mandate that the provisions of 
the FEHA be liberally construed to accomplish the purposes of 
the statute, the court held that high blood pressure, since "[it] is 
physical, and often it is handicapping," was a physical handicap 
protected by the FEHA.127 Turning to Webster's dictionary for 
an ordinary definition of "handicap," the court found that a 
handicap is "a disadvantage that makes achievement unusually 
difficult," and held that a condition of the body which has that 
disabling effect is a physical handicap.128 
Although 
the amended 
the Legislature expressly mandated that 
definition retain the American National 
119. Cassista, 856 P.2d at 1149. 
120. 651 P.2d 1151 (1982). 
121. [d. at 1153-54. 
122. See Gelb & Frankfurt, supra note 25, at 1059 n.23. 
123. American Nat'l, 651 P.2d at 1153. 
124. [d. 
125. The amended version of subsection (h) is subsection (k). See, e.g., Cassista, 856 
P.2d at 1149. 
126. American Nat'I, 651 P.2d at 1154. 
127. [d. at 1155-56. 
128. [d. at 1155. The court noted a report from the World Health Organization that 
defined handicap as a "loss or limitation on the individual's ability to participate in the 
life of the community on an equal basis with others." [d. at 1155 n.5. 
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construction,t29 the court in Cassista redefined the term "physi-
cal disability," holding that it means "an actual or perceived 
physiological disorder which affects a major body system and 
limits the individual's ability to participate in one or more major 
life activities."lso This new standard does not in fact retain the 
American National standard: "a disadvantage that makes 
achievement unusually difficult."lsl The new standard is more 
stringent than that enunciated in American National, because 
the new standard adds the requirement that the perceived disa-
bility must be in fact a "physiological disorder which affects a 
major body system. "IS2 
B. CASSISTA'S OBESITY As A PHYSICAL DISABILITY 
With the standard of "physical disability" established, the 
court then analyzed whether Cassista's excess weight was a 
physical disability. A brief survey of the limited case law in the 
area of weight discrimination revealed decisions that either al-
lowed weight to be a factor of employment qualification under 
the "bona fide occupational qualification" exception,t3s or re-
jected excess weight as a handicap because it is a "self-imposed 
and voluntary" condition.134 In most of the cases examined by 
the court, excess weight, without a "related medical condition or 
other impairment, is not a handicap."13~ The court distinguished 
the cases in which excess weight was held to constitute a physi-
cal disability on the ground that "local antidiscrimination laws 
have widely varying texts and historical antecedents. m3G 
129. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12,926. 
130. Cassista, 856 P.2d at 1150. 
131. See id. 
132. See id. 
133. See, e.g., Hegwer v. Board of Civil Service Comm'rs, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 389, 397-98 
(Ct. App. 1992); supra note 82. 
134. Cassista, 856 P.2d at 1152 (citing Tudyman v. United Airlines, 608 F. Supp. 
739 (D. Cal. 1984); Cook v. Rhode Island, 783 F. Supp. 1569 (DR!. 1992)). The court 
focused on these cases which rejected weight discrimination claims where the courts 
viewed the claimant's excess weight as a voluntary condition in the absence of medical 
evidence asserting a physiological cause. Contra Cook v. Rhode Island, 10 F.3d 17 (1st 
Cir. 1993) (specifically disapproving the relevance of voluntariness to whether the condi-
tion is protected). 
135. Cassista, 856 P.2d at 1153 (citing Bruce!. Shapiro, The Heavy Burden of Es-
tablishing Weight as a Handicap Under Anti-Discrimination Statutes, 18 W. ST. U. L. 
REV. 565, 569 (1991)). 
136. Cassista, 856 P.2d at 1150-51 n.11 (citing State Div. of Human Rights v. Xerox 
18
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Cassista did not suffer from any medical conditions caused 
by, nor impairments related to, her excess weight.137 Conse-
quently, the court concluded that her weight was not a physical 
disability within the meaning of the FEHA.138 
Cassista contended that even though an individual does not 
have an actual disability, he or she may still come within the 
purview of the statute if that individual is regarded as having a 
disability by the prospective employer .139 Her argument was 
based on the section of the statute that provides that physical 
disability includes "being regarded as having or having had . 
a disorder."14o 
The court found Cassista's argument unavailing,141 stating 
that the plain language of the statute required a claimant to 
show that the disability the employer perceived her to have 
must fall into one of the enumerated categories of disorders. 142 
"In other words, the condition, as perceived by the employer, 
must still be in the nature of a physiological disorder within the 
meaning of the FEHA, even if it is not in fact disabling."143 Be-
cause Cassista failed to present evidence that her excess weight 
was caused by, or in turn caused, a physiological disorder within 
the meaning of the FEHA, she failed to establish a prima facie 
case of employment discrimination.144 
VI. CRITIQUE 
The court's analysis is incomplete. First, its "plain lan-
guage" approach omits some of the plain language of the stat-
ute. 1411 Second, the court implicitly rejects the policy of liberal 
Corp., 480 N.E.2d 695 (N.Y. 1985); Gimello v. Agency Rent-A-Car Systems, 594 A.2d 264 
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991)). 
. 137. Cassista maintained throughout the trial that she is "a healthy, fit individual." 
[d. at 1154. 
138. [d. 
139. [d. at 1153. 
140. [d. (citing CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12,926(k)(3)). 
141. [d.; see also supra note 114 and accompanying text. 
142. Cassista, 856 P.2d at 1153. 
143. [d. 
144. [d. at 1154. 
145. See supra note 43 and accompanying text for the full text of § 12,926(k). 
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construction set forth in American National,14.6 while purporting 
to follow that case in accordance with the express legislative 
mandate. 147 
A. CONSTRUCTION OF THE STATUTE 
In holding that a perceived disability must be one that falls 
within the purview of the statute, the court relies on specific lan-
guage in the pertinent paragraph: "[b]eing regarded as having or 
having had a disease, disorder, condition, cosmetic disfigure-
ment, anatomical loss, or health impairment described in para-
graph (1) or (2)."148 That paragraph includes within the term 
"physical disability" the employer's perception of the individual 
as disabled by a disorder described in the previous 
paragraphs.149 Thus the court concluded that the disability the 
employer perceives must be one of the disabilities specifically. 
enumerated in paragraph (1) or (2); if the perceived disability is 
not one of the disorders listed, then discrimination on that 
ground is not proscribed by the FEHA.lI1O 
In reaching this conclusion, the court purports to construe 
the plain language of the statute.lIIl However, the court ignores 
the opening words of the section it undertakes to construe: 
" 'physical disability' includes, but is not limited to, all of the 
following .... "1112 The plain language of the statute in full states 
that the description of "physical disability" given is not the ex-
clusive one. IllS 
146. American Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 651 P.2d 1151, 
1155-56 (1982). 
147. See CAL. Gov'T CODE § 12,926. 
148. Cassista, 856 P.2d at 1148 (citing CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12,926(k) (West Supp. 
1993». 
149. See CAL. GOv'T CODE § 12,926(k). 
150. Cassista, 856 P.2d at 1153-54. See also Plaintiff-Appellant's Petition for Re-
hearing at 5, Cassista v. Community Foods, Inc., 856 P.2d 1143 (1993) (No. S028230), in 
which Cassista's attorney observes that the portion of the supreme court's opinion ana-
lyzing "Perception of Handicap or Disability" is "lacking in analysis. Instead of inter-
preting and applying the existing law ... this Court ... eviscerates the prohibition 
against discrimination based on perceived handicap that is articulated by the Legislature 
.... " Id. at 5. 
151. Cassista, 856 P.2d at 1153. 
152. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12,926(k) (emphasis added). 
153. See id. 
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The court has previously construed the word "includes" in a 
statutory definition. In People v. Western Air Lines, Inc. 154 the 
court construed two Public Utilities Code sections which defined 
"public utilities" and "common carriers" and gave a list of "in-
clu[ded]" entities.155 The court held that the lists were not ex-
clusive, noting "[t]he term 'includes' is ordinarily a word of en-
largement and not of limitation. The statutory definition of a 
thing as 'including' certain things does not necessarily place 
thereon a meaning limited to the inclusions. "156 In the instant 
case, the statutory language is even more explicit. Section 
12,926(k) states that the definition of "physical disability" "in-
cludes, but is not limited to" a list of disorders. 157 
The court disregarded this, and provided instead an unnec-
essary analysis of the different types of enumerated physiologi-
cal disorders. That analysis was unnecessary because Cassista 
did not contend that she had any disease, anatomical loss, or 
health impairment.158 She averred that she was actually healthy 
and fit,159 and that Community Foods regarded her as having a 
physical disability she did not in fact possess.160 
The court's analysis of the statute violated two of its own 
rules of statutory construction. First, the court disregarded the 
canon it recognized in Klarfeld v. Berg: 16l "In analyzing the text 
of these enactments, we are bound by the fundamental rule that 
154. 268 P.2d 723 (Cal. 1954). 
155. [d. at 733. 
156. [d. at 733; accord, People v. Horner, 87 Cal. Rptr. 917, 920 (Ct. App. 1970) 
(construing a statutory definition of tear gas "includ[ing]" an illustrative but not exclu-
sive list). 
157. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 12,926(k) (emphasis added). 
A considerable portion of the court's opinion in Cassista reviewed with approval 
Justice Mosk's dissent in American National, in which he criticized the majority's con-
struction of the term "includes." When American National was decided, section 12,926 
contained only the word "includes" at the beginning of the definition of physical disabil-
ity. In dissent, Justice Mosk noted that "the Legislature makes it clear that it is using 
'includes' as a term of enlargement by adding the phrase, 'including, but not limited to 
.... " American Nat'l, 651 P.2d at 1156. The amended version of the statute now con-
tains the phrase "includes, but is not limited to"; it is interesting that the Cassista court 
discussed with approval some excerpts of Justice Mosk's dissent in American National 
but omitted that part and did not adopt his construction of that phrase. 
158. See Cassista, 856 P.2d at 1147-49. 
159. Cassista, 856 P.2d at 1154. 
160. [d. at 1153. 
161. 633 P.2d 204 (Cal. 1981). 
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it is our duty to adopt a construction which will effectuate the 
purpose which the legislative body sought to promote in enact-
ing the statute or ordinance. "162 The Legislature did not leave 
its intentions in doubt: "The provisions of this part shall be con-
strued liberally for the accomplishment of the purposes 
thereof."163 One of the purposes of the FEHA is to eliminate dis-
crimination in employment;164 the court's conservative construc-
tion of the statute has the opposite effect. 
Also, in Fields v. EU/65 the court noted that "[s]trained in-
terpretation, or construction leading to unreasonable or imprac-
tical results, is to be avoided."166 The result of the holding in 
Cassista is unreasonable. An employer who discriminates against 
an obese employee will have broken the law if it turns out that 
the employee also suffers from a disorder listed in the statute, 
such as a thyroid problem, even though the employer was una-
ware of that condition. However, if it turns out that the em-
ployee does not have one of the listed disorders, the employer 
may legally discriminate against the employee on that same ba-
sis: obesity. Such a holding, which distinguishes between actual 
and perceived disabilities, "makes no sense. . . since that inter-
pretation would only protect against discrimination in cases 
where the wrongdoer accurately perceived the discriminatee's 
'classification'. "167 
B. FINAL COMMENTS 
The court may well have been influenced by the same stere-
otypical views of overweight people as the personnel director at 
Community Foods,168 citing as "particularly noteworthy" cases 
which view excess weight as a self-imposed or voluntary condi-
tion.169 This view is shortsighted; a number of factors, including 
heredity, socioeconomic status, gender, and race, influence an 
162. Klarfeld, 633 P.2d at 208. 
163. CAL. GOV'T CODE §. 12,993(a). 
164. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12,920. 
165. 556 P.2d 729 (Cal. 1976). 
166. Fields, 556 P.2d at 733. 
167. Gimello v. Agency Rent-A-Car Sys., 594 A.2d 264 (citing Poff v. Caro, 549 A.2d 
900 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1987)); see supra note 91. 
168. See Cassista, 856 P.2d at 1145-46. 
169. Cassista, 856 P.2d at 1152. 
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individual's body weight. I70 Obesity researchers consistently find 
that obese people cannot control their weight. l7l 
Obese people pay a serious price for their conditions. The 
stigma of obesity results in social and economic hardship: over-
weight people complete fewer years of school, have lower house-
hold incomes, and have higher rates of household poverty.172 Ec-
onomic and social disability are listed among the seven major 
medical and social risks of obesity in a 1982 study.173 Race and 
gender are implicated in obesity discrimination as well: a dispro-
portionate number of obese people are African-American 
women. 174 
Many courts, including the California Supreme Court, ei-
ther explicitly or implicitly reject obesity as a protected category 
because they view it as a voluntary state.17II One argument 
against including obesity as a protected category is the concern 
that such a holding would open the floodgates to all manner of 
"voluntary" condition discrimination claims, such as alcoholism 
and drug addiction. 
170. Steven L. Gortmaker, Aviva Must, James M. Perrin, Arthur M. Sobol, & Wil-
liam H. Dietz, Social and Economic Consequences of Overweight In Adolescence and 
Young Adulthood, 329 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1008-12 (1993); see also Jane Osborne Baker, 
The Rehabilitation Act of 1973: Protection For Victims of Weight Discrimination?, 29 
UCLA L. REV. 947 (1982) (discussing the stigma and discrimination suffered by obese 
people). 
171. See, e.g., Gina Kolata, Old Beliefs About Obesity Wear Thin, DET. FREE PRESS, 
Nov. 30, 1992, at.1E; Michael S. Wilkes, M.D. & Miriam Shuchman, M.D., The Tyranny 
of Size: Weight, Like Height, Is Inherited, but No One Expects a Tall Person to Cut Off 
His Legs, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 13, 1991, at 26; Albert J. Stunkard & Thorkild Sorensen, LA., 
Obesity and Socioeconomic Status - A Complex Relation, 329 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1036, 
(1993) (finding in part that adopted children's weight mirrors that of their birth parents, 
not their adopted parents). 
172. Stunkard & Thorkild, supra note 171, at 1036. The doctors who conducted this 
study concluded that discrimination may be responsible for the economic detriment suf-
fered by overweight people, and suggested that "overweight" be included as a protected 
category in antidiscrimination laws. Id. at 1037. See also Karol V. Mason, Employment 
Discrimination Against the Overweight, 15 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 337 (1982) (discussing in 
depth the employment discrimination often encountered by the overweight and examin-
ing medical efforts to find the causes of obesity). 
173. Baker, supra note 170, at 951 n.39 (1992) (citing Obesity in America, INT'L. J. 
OBESITY 363, 368 (1979) (G. Brayed.)). 
174. Mason, Employment Discrimination Against the Overweight, supra note 83, at 
344-45 (presenting in detail statistical analyses of race, gender, and socioeconomic status 
in relation to obesity). 
175. See, e.g., Cassista, 856 P.2d at 1152 (discussing with approval Tudyman and 
Cook, both of which stress that the plaintiffs' weight was voluntarily self-imposed). 
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This concern is unwarranted. The Americans with Disabili-
ties Act includes under its shield such conditions as alcoholism 
and drug addiction,I76 and excludes other "voluntary" conditions 
such as compulsive gambling, pedophilia, and transvestitism. I77 
The limits are already substantially delineated. To protect alco-
holism and drug addiction while excluding obesity "raises signif-
icant questions of fairness. To exclude obese persons implies a 
judgment that they are less seriously impaired or stigmatized, or 
less deserving of legal protection for some other reason."I7S 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Private employers may now, with impunity, freely discrimi-
nate against overweight but otherwise healthy people. This un-
reasonable result follows from a narrow and incomplete analysis 
of the FEHA, and implicitly rejects the Legislature's express 
mandate that the statute be liberally construed. The court's 
analysis also violates its own rules of statutory construction. 
The holding of Cassista directly contravenes the purpose of 
the FEHA to "protect and safeguard the right and opportunity 
of all persons to seek and hold employment free from 
discrimination. "171' 
Kimberly B. Dunworth * 
176. See 28 C.F.R. § 35.104. Both drug addiction and alcoholism are also protected 
disorders in the Rehabilitation Act. 45 C.F.R. pt. 84 app. A, 11 4 (1981). 
177. See 28 C.F.R. § 35.104 (1992); see also Brent E. Kidwell, The Americans with 
Disabilities Act of 1990: Overview and Analysis, 26 IND. L. REV. 707 (1993). 
178. Baker, Protection for Victims of Weight Discrimination? supra note 170, at 
967 (arguing that obesity, like alcoholism and drug addiction, is popularly viewed as a 
voluntary condition while medically classified as a disease, and should be accorded the 
same legal protections). 
179. Brown v. Superior Court, 691 P.2d 272, 277 (Cal. 1984) (citing CAL. GOV'T CODE 
§ 12,920). 
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